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Abstract
It was hypothesized that attitudes will become
most polarized when individuals have an
opportunity for thought about a group for
which they “tune in” a well-developed
schema that is consistent with initial
information. This process should be greater
for low need than high need for cognition
thinkers. Participants were given different
opportunities for thought about either freedom
fighters or rebel insurgents. Initial
information was either consistent or
inconsistent with group descriptors.
Participants completed the Need for
Cognition Scale. These hypotheses were
partially supported. Attitudes were more
polarized when participants tuned in a schema
that was consistent with initial information.
Limitations of this investigation (e.g., no
manipulation checks) and future directions
(e.g., direct assessment of schemas) are
discussed.

On early morning September 11,
2001, you slowly move around your house
preparing for the day ahead. You sit down
with a cup of coffee to watch the morning
news. You flip on your television and stop
dead in your tracks. What is going on? Did
they just say that an airplane flew into the
North Tower of the World Trade Center? It
was just a freak accident. What was that?
Right before your eyes, another airplane flies
directly into the South Tower. Your pulse
quickens as you try to comprehend what just
happened. Minutes later, you watch as the
Twin Towers collapse crushing thousands of
human beings under a mass of steel, concrete,
and flames.
Now, no matter which channel you
turn to, all that you see is footage of
destruction. The Pentagon is in flames, both
of the Twin Towers have collapsed, and
another plane crashed down in a Pennsylvania
field. What is that news anchor saying?
Middle Eastern male terrorists are responsible
for highjacking and crashing all of these
planes. Why would they want to do
something that horrible to us? By eleven
o’clock, you watch in stunned disbelief as our
government closes all airspace surrounding
the United States. These Middle Eastern
terrorists just committed the deadliest attack
on American soil since the December 1941
attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese.
How did you feel when you read about
these events? Were you thoughtful, sad,
angry, or depressed? Have you ever glanced
at a group of Middle Eastern individuals and
wondered if, perhaps, they too were secretly
involved in a terrorist plot against the United
States? Now that you reminisced about
September 11th, you may notice that the
longer you think about these events, the
stronger your emotions about these events
(i.e., September 11th attacks) become. Many
researchers (e.g., Tesser, 1978) have
conducted studies in which participants affect
their own feelings about an attitude object
(i.e., a person, place, or thing) just by thinking
about that object.

Self-Generated Attitude Change
Mere thought about an attitude object
(i.e., a person, place, or thing) is sufficient to
produce self-generated attitude change (for
literature reviews, see Tesser, 1978, and
Tesser, Martin & Mendolia, 1995). The
phenomenon of self-generated attitude change
occurs when individuals experience attitude
polarization following an opportunity for
thought. During this process of attitude
polarization, individuals’ initially favorable
attitudes become more favorable or initially
unfavorable attitudes become more
unfavorable. In sum, individuals may change
their attitudes simply as a result of thought.
In a study on impression formation,
for example, Sadler and Tesser (1973) asked
participants to evaluate either a likeable or
dislikeable research partner. Once they made
an initial evaluation of their partners,
participants were either asked to think about
their partners or were distracted from thinking
about their partners. During a second
evaluation of their partners, participants who
were asked to think about their partners
evaluated likeable partners more positively
and evaluated dislikeable partners more
negatively than participants who were
distracted from thinking about their partner.
Thus, individuals experience attitude
polarization after engaging in thought.
How do changes in individuals’
attitudes occur? There are two processes
involved in self-generated attitude change
(Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). First,
when individuals think about an attitude
object, they tend to modify their beliefs in
order to make beliefs about that attitude
object consistent with one another (e.g.,
Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Leone, 1984).
Second, individuals tend to have feelings (i.e.,
attitudes) about an attitude object based on
current beliefs these individuals hold about
that attitude object (e.g., Leone, 1991; Leone
& Aronow, 1992; Liberman & Chaiken,
1991). That is, individuals make their beliefs
consistent through thought and, in turn, base
their feelings on those consistent beliefs.
These processes are a foundation for selfgenerated attitude change.

When individuals engage in thought,
they can modify the evaluative consistency of
their attitude-related beliefs (Tesser, 1978;
Tesser et al., 1995). Evaluative consistency is
consistency along a good-bad dimension
(Liberman & Chaiken, 1991). That is, if
individuals believe that something is bad, then
they may modify their beliefs in order to
maintain their negative evaluation. If
individuals believe that something is good,
then they may modify their beliefs in order to
maintain their positive evaluation. Individuals
maintain evaluative consistency when they
think about an attitude object (i.e., person,
place, or thing) by generating additional
information consistent with other beliefs held
about that object (Tesser & Cowan, 1975),
reinterpreting otherwise ambiguous
information to become consistent with beliefs
held about that object (Tesser & Cowan,
1977), or discounting information that is
inconsistent with beliefs held about that
object (Lord, 1989; Lord, Ross, & Lepper,
1979; Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd,
1993). If an experimenter, for instance,
describes a group of people to a participant as
warm, intelligent, and hard-working, then that
participant may also generate additional
belief-consistent thoughts such as diligent,
strong, and kind. If an experimenter
introduces to that participant another group
trait (e.g., selfish) and this new trait is not
consistent with other beliefs held by that
participant concerning such a group, then one
of two reactions could occur. This participant
could attempt to reinterpret the trait selfish to
mean that this group being described is
absorbed in work duties and enjoys receiving
credit for achievements. This participant
could also attempt to discard the trait selfish
all together because that trait does not fit in
with his or her beliefs concerning this group.
In other words, individuals tend to maintain
information that is evaluatively consistent
with their initial beliefs about an attitude
object and discard or reinterpret information
that is evaluatively inconsistent with their
initial beliefs about an attitude object.
In sum, individuals are able to modify
via thought the evaluative consistency of their

beliefs about an attitude object and use those
beliefs as a basis for their feelings (i.e.,
attitudes). The longer these individuals spend
thinking about an attitude object, the more
likely they are to experience attitude
polarization (see Tesser, 1978, and Tesser et
al., 1995, for review of the literature).
Individuals showed evidence of experiencing
thought-belief and belief-feeling processes
during self-generated attitude change while
thinking about research partners (e.g., Sadler
& Tesser, 1973), fashions and football (e.g.,
Leone & Tesser, 1977), capital punishment
(e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985), and political
issues (e.g., Leone, 1994).
Role of schemas. When provided with
an opportunity for thought, why do
individuals tend to experience attitude
polarization rather than some other type of
attitude change? Changes in beliefs brought
about during thought are not random but are
instead based on individuals’ cognitive
schemata (Leone & Ensley, 1985, 1986;
Tesser & Leone, 1977). A cognitive schema is
“a cognitive structure that represents
knowledge about a concept or type of
stimulus, including its attributes and the
relations among the attributes” (Fiske &
Taylor, 1991, p. 91). In essence, a schema is a
“naïve theory” held by an individual
concerning an attitude object (Leone &
Ensley, 1985; Tesser & Leone, 1977). When
individuals think about an attitude object, they
may access stored knowledge (i.e., cognitive
schemas) about that particular attitude object
(Tesser & Leone, 1977).
How do individuals develop these
naïve theories (i.e., schemas) about a
particular attitude object? Some individuals
may rely upon outside sources such as news
media. Media coverage of the September 11th
attacks on the World Trade Center in New
York may be an example of individuals’
reliance upon outside sources in developing
cognitive schemas. For many weeks
following the September 11th attacks,
individuals viewed images of both Middle
Eastern airline highjackers and destruction of
the World Trade Center. Individuals viewing
these images from outside sources (i.e., news

media) may create their own Middle Eastern
terrorist schema because of this repeated
association between ethnicity of September
11th highjackers and destruction of the World
Trade Center.
Individuals may use their schemas as
sources of attitude-related beliefs (e.g.,
generation of additional beliefs) as well as
rules (e.g., reinterpretation and discounting of
beliefs) for processing attitude relevant ideas
(Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). In other
words, individuals may use their schemas to
determine what information they can deduce
(i.e., generation of beliefs), what information
they can substitute (i.e., reinterpretation of
beliefs), and what information they can ignore
(i.e., discounting of beliefs) about a particular
attitude object. Suppose, for example, an
experimenter initially exposed participants to
a group of people described as imaginative,
loyal, and skilled. After exposure to this
group, participants may generate other traits
such as diligent, strong, and kind to go along
with their initial beliefs about this group. This
generation of additional beliefs may result
from participants accessing a particular
schema they hold concerning a group of
people who are imaginative, loyal, and
skilled.
After participants form their initial
impression of an imaginative, loyal, and
skilled group of people, an experimenter
could then define that group of people as
terrorists. Because this label of terrorists is
most likely inconsistent with the current
cognitive schema being used by these
participants, they must choose between two
possible options. First, participants may find
ways to incorporate this terrorist label into
their schema by reinterpreting initial traits
(i.e., imaginative, loyal, skilled) to mean that
this group is passionate about their cause and
fights for their ideals. Second, participants
may discount this terrorist label because that
label does not fit into their current cognitive
schema about this group. By using a
particular cognitive schema, individuals may
generate additional beliefs, reinterpret
ambiguous beliefs, or discount inconsistent
beliefs.

Not everyone holds similar schemas
concerning an attitude object such as
terrorism. Therefore, individuals may
interpret terrorism differently based on their
level of knowledge (e.g., well-informed vs.
less-informed) concerning terrorism.
Individuals who possess well-developed
schemas should also have a greater potential
for cognitive change than individuals who
have less-developed schemas (Tesser, 1978;
Tesser et al., 1995). That is, individuals with
well-developed schemas should generate
additional beliefs, reinterpret ambiguous
beliefs, and discount inconsistent beliefs more
readily than individuals with less-developed
schemas. Individuals, for example, who
closely watch the United State’s progress in
the War on Terrorism since September 11,
2001 via electronic media (i.e., news and
internet) or paper media (i.e., newspapers and
magazines) may possess better developed
schemas of terrorism than individuals who do
not closely watch the United State’s progress
in the War on Terrorism since September 11,
2001. Individuals who think about an attitude
object using a well-developed schema tend to
experience greater attitude polarization than
individuals using a less-developed schema
(e.g., Leone & Ensley, 1985; Millar & Tesser,
1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). Thus,
individuals’ attitudes concerning terrorism
could be affected by which type of schema
(i.e., well-developed vs. less-developed) they
currently hold about terrorism.
Individuals may use different schemas
to think about the same attitude object
(Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995).
Individuals using different schemas to think
about an attitude object may experience
different attitudes about that attitude object.
Therefore, thought-induced attitude
polarization is dependent upon the nature of a
schema an individual “tunes in” for an
attitude object (e.g., Clary, Tesser &
Downing, 1978; Tesser & Danheizer, 1978).
Tesser and Danheiser (1978), for example,
asked participants to evaluate likeable and
dislikeable partners. Participants who were
told they would cooperate with these partners
evaluated both likeable and dislikeable

partners more favorably than did participants
who were told they would compete with these
partners. Thus, individuals who believed they
needed to cooperate with their partners tuned
in positive schemas for both likeable and
dislikeable partners, whereas individuals who
believed they needed to compete with their
partners tuned in negative schemas for both
likeable and dislikeable partners. An
experimenter, for example, shows a group of
college students the article title “Terrorists
Bomb Train Station in Switzerland”. It is
possible that during thought those college
students may tune in different schemas about
terrorists depending on those students own
personal views on terrorism. When tuning in
different schemas about terrorists, some
college students may access an unfavorable
schema and think about extremists who
purposefully target innocent civilians in an
attempt to terrorize the world, whereas other
students may access a favorable schema and
think about revolutionaries who fight for a
cause using any means possible. Because
these college students may tune in different
schemas about that same attitude object (i.e.,
terrorists), these students may experience
differences in attitude polarization depending
which “tuned in” schema they use.
Attitude attenuation. Attitude
polarization is not, however, the only result of
increased thought (Leone & Aronow, 1992;
Leone & Baldwin, 1983). Another result of
increased thought individuals may experience
is attitude attenuation. During attitude
attenuation, individuals abandon their beliefs
about an attitude object thus causing an
attenuation (i.e., weakening) of attitudes
supported by those abandoned beliefs (Leone,
1996; Tesser, 1978). Individuals may
experience attitude attenuation due to
situational factors (i.e., cognitive constraints)
and/or individual factors (i.e., cognitive
styles).
Individuals may experience attitude
attenuation due to situational factors such as
cognitive constraints. Individuals are likely to
experience attitude attenuation when they are
presented with cognitive constraints prior to
engaging in thought (Leone & Aronow, 1992;

Leone & Baldwin, 1983; Tesser, Leone, &
Clary, 1978). There are two types of cognitive
constraints: reality constraints and process
constraints.
Individuals presented with reality
constraints (i.e., presence of an attitude object
during thought) may find that some of their
beliefs are contradictory with reality (Leone,
1984; Leone, Taylor, & Adams, 1991; Tesser,
1976). Individuals who engage in thought in
the presence of an attitude object must
determine if their beliefs about that attitude
object are accurate (Leone et al., 1991).
Please recall an earlier example of college
students who are initially exposed to the
article title “Terrorists Bomb Train Station in
Switzerland”. Suppose these college students
are asked to read this article title and then
think about that title in an unconstrained
manner. If, as a result of unconstrained
thought, these college students activate a
schema concerning all terrorists being of
Middle Eastern descent, then these students
may have polarized attitudes toward
individuals of Middle Eastern descent. In
order to introduce a reality constraint to those
college students’ thought processes, an
experimenter could familiarize these students
with a community of Middle Eastern
individuals living within the United States
who actively advocate peace. Learning about
a community of peaceful Middle Eastern
individuals could introduce a “reality” to
these college students that not all individuals
of Middle Eastern descent support violence.
This “reality” may serve as a constraint to
those college students’ thoughts. When these
college students begin thinking in a
constrained manner, they may be more likely
to experience attitude attenuation rather than
attitude polarization. Attitude attenuation
may occur because those college students
discount their belief that all people of Middle
Eastern descent are terrorists.
Individuals presented with process
constraints (i.e., critically examining a
derivation of beliefs during thought) often
discover that some of their beliefs are derived
from illogical processes or poor inferences
(Leone, 1996; Leone & Aronow, 1992;

Tesser, 1978). Please recall an earlier
example of an experimenter initially exposing
college students to the article title “Terrorists
Bomb Train Station in Switzerland” and then
giving these college students an opportunity
to think about that article in an unconstrained
manner. As a result, those college students
could experience attitude polarization if they
activate a schema based on beliefs that all
terrorists are individuals of Middle Eastern
descent. As a process constraint to these
college students’ thoughts, an experimenter
could ask these students to explain their
beliefs about this article. By thinking about
and then explicitly verbalizing their reasoning
about the article “Terrorists Bomb Train
Station in Switzerland”, those students may
notice illogical beliefs (e.g., not all terrorists
are individuals of Middle Eastern descent)
they are using in their thought processes.
Once those students recognize their illogical
beliefs, those students may discount their
illogical beliefs. Those students may
experience attitude attenuation because they
have constrained their illogical beliefs during
thought. Individuals can reduce (i.e.,
attenuate) effects of unconstrained thought on
their beliefs when those individuals have
process constraints introduced to their
thinking (Leone & Aronow, 1992; Tesser et
al., 1995).
Individuals may experience attitude
polarization due to individual differences in
ways these individuals think about an attitude
object (i.e., person, place, or thing). No two
individuals think exactly alike. Therefore,
each individual will think about an attitude
object in a different way. There are many
individual differences in thought processing
including dogmatism, objectivism, and need
for cognition.
Dogmatism is referred to as
“differences in the nature of belief systems
which individuals use to simultaneously serve
as a need to understand the social world and a
need to protect themselves from potentially
threatening ideas” (Rokeach, 1960, p. 146).
That is, individuals use their beliefs in order
to understand their social world (i.e., people,
places, and events) in a non-threatening

manner. Individuals may be dogmatic or nondogmatic. Dogmatic individuals are
characterized by a high degree of isolation in
their beliefs (Rokeach, 1960). Non-dogmatic
individuals are characterized by a high degree
of openness in their beliefs (Rokeach, 1960).
In terms of attitude polarization, dogmatic
individuals may be more likely than nondogmatic individuals to experience attitude
polarization (Leone, 1989).
Objectivism is referred to as a
“tendency to base one’s judgments and beliefs
on empirical information and rational
considerations” (Leary, Shepperd, McNeil,
Jenkins, & Barnes, 1986, p. 33). That is,
some individuals tend to use objective bases
when forming their opinions and to value both
reason and logic over intuition when making
judgments (Leone, 1996). Individuals may be
objective or non-objective. Objective
individuals tend to seek out empirical
information when they are uncertain and
process that information in a rational fashion
(Leary et al., 1986). Non-objective
individuals tend to rely on personal intuition
when they are uncertain and process
information in a subjective fashion (Leary et
al., 1986). In terms of attitude polarization,
objective individuals may be more likely than
non-objective individuals to experience
attitude polarization as opportunity for
thought increases (Leone, 1996).
Need for Cognition
Need for cognition is defined as
differences in “people’s tendency to engage in
and enjoy effortful cognitive activity”
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). That is,
individuals vary in their level of motivation to
engage in and enjoy effortful thinking about a
particular attitude object (i.e., person, place,
or thing). Individuals both high and low in
need for cognition strive to understand their
world, but they gain this understanding
through different means (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982, 1984; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, &
Rodriguez, 1986).
Individuals high in need for cognition
are motivated to engage in effortful thought.
Individuals high in need for cognition could

be labeled “chronic cognizers” (i.e.,
motivated thinkers) because these individuals
enjoy thinking when given an opportunity
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).
Individuals high in need for cognition tend to
seek out additional information as well as
reflect upon information they currently
possess in order to understand relationships,
people, and events (Cacioppo et al., 1996). An
experimenter, for example, may show
participants high in need for cognition a news
story concerning Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice discussing Osama Bin
Laden as a terrorist leader targeting American
citizens. This experimenter may then ask
these participants for their opinions about this
news story. During thought, these individuals
may recall past occurrences such as the
Central Intelligence Agency of the United
States covertly supporting Bin Laden and his
troops against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Rather than accepting this news story as the
only source of information about Bin Laden,
individuals high in need for cognition may
recall additional related information in order
to further understand this relationship
between the United States and Osama Bin
Ladin.
In contrast to individuals high in need
for cognition, individuals low in need for
cognition are not motivated to engage in
effortful thought. Individuals low in need for
cognition could be labeled “cognitive misers”
(i.e., unmotivated thinkers) because these
individuals only think when absolutely
necessary (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Individuals
low in need for cognition tend to rely upon
others (i.e., experts), heuristics (i.e.,
stereotypes), or social comparisons (e.g.,
similar others) to understand relationships,
people, and events (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
An experimenter, for example, may show
participants low in need for cognition a news
story concerning Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice discussing Osama Bin
Ladin as a terrorist leader targeting American
citizens. This experimenter may then ask
these participants for their opinion about this
news story. During thought, these individuals
may consider Condoleezza Rice an expert on

terrorism and agree with her that Bin Ladin is
indeed a terrorist leader who targets American
citizens. Rather than engaging in further
thought about this information, individuals
low in need for cognition may simply accept
this information as valid because an expert
presented this information.
Individuals who differ in need for
cognition also vary in amounts of information
they are able to recall. Researchers have
shown that individuals high in need for
cognition are better able than are individuals
low in need for cognition to recall information
to which those individuals are exposed (e.g.,
Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). Cacioppo
and his colleagues instructed participants to
read articles containing either six strong or six
weak arguments in favor of comprehensive
college graduation exams. Regardless of
argument quality (i.e., strong vs. weak
arguments), participants high in need for
cognition recalled nearly two thirds of all
arguments whereas participants low in need
for cognition recalled roughly half of all
arguments. Other researchers have replicated
these findings that individuals high in need
for cognition recall more information than do
individuals low in need for cognition (e.g.,
Lassiter, Briggs, & Bowman, 1991; MeyersLevy & Peracchio, 1992).
Individuals who differ in need for
cognition also vary in their use of routes to
persuasion. Individuals high in need for
cognition tend to use a central (i.e.,
systematic) route in order to think about a
particular task, whereas individuals low in
need for cognition tend to use a peripheral
(i.e., superficial) route in order to think about
a particular task (Cacioppo et al., 1996). In
other words, high need for cognition
individuals will elaborate on a task during
thought thereby using a central route to
persuasion, whereas low need for cognition
individuals will only engage in superficial
thought about a task thereby using a
peripheral route to persuasion. This
systematic versus superficial thought
processing is a foundation for other
differences between individuals high in need

for cognition and individuals low in need for
cognition.
For example, individuals who differ in
need for cognition vary in their
responsiveness to argument quality.
Researchers have shown that individuals (i.e.,
high need for cognition) who think about and
elaborate upon persuasive arguments tend to
base their attitudes on argument quality more
so than do individuals (i.e., low need for
cognition) who think about those persuasive
arguments in a superficial manner (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 1983; Petty, Wells, & Brock,
1976). Cacioppo et al. (1983) conducted
research in which participants read a
persuasive message containing either four
strong arguments or four weak arguments.
These researchers found that individuals high
in need for cognition based their attitudes
about that message on the quality (i.e., strong
vs. weak) of those arguments more often than
did individuals low in need for cognition.
Other researchers have replicated these
findings in which individuals high in need for
cognition more so than individuals low in
need for cognition base their attitudes toward
persuasive messages on argument quality
(e.g., Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987;
Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; Priester & Petty,
1995).
Individuals who differ in need for
cognition also vary in their responsiveness to
peripheral cues (i.e., superficial information).
According to researchers utilizing the
elaboration likelihood model (e.g., Cialdini,
Petty, & Caccioppo, 1981) and the heuristicsystematic model (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, &
Eagly, 1989), if individuals are unmotivated
or unable to think in a thorough manner about
information within a persuasive message, then
those individuals may be influenced by
peripheral cues within that message. Because
individuals high in need for cognition are
motivated to think about information
thoroughly, they should be less susceptible to
peripheral cues than should individuals low in
need for cognition. Individuals low in need
for cognition, more so than individuals high
in need for cognition, show evidence of
influence from peripheral cues in research

studies involving expertise and attractiveness
of message source (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, &
Goldman, 1981), number of arguments
contained within a message (e.g., Petty &
Cacioppo, 1984), and merely stating number
of arguments to be given (e.g., Chaiken,
Axsom, & Yates, 1987; Haugtvedt et al.,
1992).
Individuals who differ in need for
cognition also vary in number of thoughts
generated during cognitive tasks. Several
researchers have reported that individuals
high in need for cognition generate additional
thoughts that are relevant to their cognitive
tasks more so than do individuals low in need
for cognition (e.g., Axsom et al., 1987;
Haugtvedt et al., 1992). Not all researchers,
however, have reached similar conclusions
about thought generation from individuals
high in need for cognition. Some researchers
maintain that individuals do not display
differences in need for cognition by means of
listing overall number of task-relevant
thoughts but rather by generating thoughts
that reflect overall argument quality (e.g.,
Bodenhausen, 1988; Priester & Petty, 1995).
These researchers maintain that individuals
high in need for cognition not only generate a
greater number of thoughts than do
individuals low in need for cognition but also
generate thoughts which are reflective of
argument quality.
Individuals who differ in need for
cognition also vary in connections of beliefs
with judgments. In other words, if individuals
make carefully considered judgments, then
those judgments should reflect the beliefs
held by those individuals (Cacioppo et al.,
1996). Several researchers have found that
individuals high in need for cognition more so
than individuals low in need for cognition
form judgments that are based on those
individuals’ beliefs (e.g., Haugtvedt et al.,
1992; Verplanken, 1989). Other researchers
maintain that initial attitudes (i.e., judgments)
and amount of thought are correlated in
individuals high in need for cognition,
whereas initial attitudes (i.e., judgments) and
amount of thought are not correlated in
individuals low in need for cognition (e.g.,

Hastie & Park, 1986; Haugtvedt et al., 1992;
Verplanken, 1989).
Individuals who differ in need for
cognition also vary in amounts of knowledge
possessed. That is, individuals (i.e., high in
need for cognition) who actively seek out and
process information are more likely to have a
greater amount of stored knowledge than are
those individuals (i.e., low in need for
cognition) who do not actively seek out and
process information (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Researchers have gathered evidence that
individuals high in need for cognition more so
than individuals low in need for cognition
possess greater amounts of knowledge about
presidential candidates (Cacioppo et al.,
1986), types of birds (Martin, Ward, Achee,
& Wyer, 1993), and trivial test questions
(Wolfe & Grosch, 1990). Overall, individuals
high in need for cognition often possess a
greater knowledge base than do individuals
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et al.,
1996).
Individuals who differ in their need
for cognition may also vary in their use of
stereotypes. According to Snyder and Miene
(1994), stereotypes are over-generalized
beliefs about various members of social
categories (e.g., African Americans, women,
or terrorists). Rather than having individual
attributes and expected behaviors, these social
category members are given a shared set of
attributes and expected behaviors. Individuals
using stereotypes are able to ignore individual
characteristics of a member in a social
category by seeing that member as part of a
generalized group. Snyder and Miene also
state that individuals may use stereotypes as
cognitive economizers in a sense that, by
using stereotypes, individuals can reduce
incoming information to a manageable size.
In this cognitive view, stereotyping
plays a similar role to that of schemas in selfgenerated attitude change. Individuals use
schemas in order to reduce cognitive effort
when thinking about an attitude object (i.e.,
person, place, or thing). If individuals use
stereotypes in order to reduce their cognitive
load during thought, then it is possible that

these individuals may use stereotypes in a
similar fashion as they use schemas.
Do individuals differing in need for
cognition (i.e., high vs. low) vary in their use
of stereotypes? Some researchers (e.g.,
Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kawakami, Dovidio,
Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Waller,
1993) have found that individuals high or low
in need for cognition both use stereotypes
when thinking about an attitude object.
However, those individuals (i.e., high vs. low
need for cognition) differ in how they use
stereotypes. In two recent studies, researchers
have found individual differences in
stereotyping based on differences in
participants’ need for cognition (Crawford &
Skowronski, 1998; Perlini & Hansen, 2001).
In a study on information recall,
Crawford and Skowronski (1998) asked
participants to recall both stereotypeconsistent and stereotype-inconsistent
personality traits of individuals in the
presence of or absence of an occupational
label. These researchers found that
individuals high in need for cognition were
able to recall more stereotype-consistent traits
than were individuals low in need for
cognition when traits were presented with an
occupational label. In a no occupational label
condition, however, there were no significant
differences between individuals high or low
in need for cognition in recall of trait
information. Crawford and Skowronski found
that not only did individuals high in need for
cognition recall more trait information than
individuals low in need for cognition but also
that individuals high in need for cognition
also used stereotypes (i.e., schemas) more so
than did individuals low in need for cognition
in order to recall that trait information.
In their study on responsiveness to
peripheral cues, Perlini and Hansen (2001)
asked participants to give attractiveness
ratings of several photos. These researchers
found that although both high and low need
for cognition individuals exhibited use of
attractiveness stereotyping, individuals low in
need for cognition gave more favorable
ratings to attractive photos than to
unattractive photos. In this study, individuals

low in need for cognition more so than
individuals high in need for cognition were
affected by attractiveness (i.e., peripheral
cues). This difference in attractiveness ratings
may be due to high need for cognition
individuals showing a preference toward a
central route of thinking (Perlini & Hansen,
2001). Although high need for cognition
individuals did use attractiveness stereotypes,
they did not rely on those stereotypes as
heavily as did low need for cognition
individuals; therefore, it is likely that high
need for cognition individuals engaged in
additional elaborative thought about those
photographs.
Researchers from these two studies
have provided somewhat contradictory
findings concerning effects of individual
differences in need for cognition on
stereotyping. In one study, researchers
observed that individuals high in need for
cognition used stereotypes more often than
did individuals low in need for cognition
(Crawford & Skowronski, 1998). In another
study, researchers observed that individuals
low in need for cognition used stereotypes
more often than did individuals high in need
for cognition (Perlini & Hansen, 2001).
To summarize, individuals who differ
in need for cognition also vary in their
enjoyment of thinking, their tendency to
engage in tasks which require active thought,
and their motivation to acquire additional
information (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Individuals high in need for cognition enjoy
thinking about attitude objects (i.e., people,
places, and things), engage in active thinking
during tasks, and are motivated to seek out
additional information about attitude objects.
In contrast, individuals low in need for
cognition think only as much as necessary
about attitude objects, complete tasks without
engaging in active thought, and are not
motivated to seek out additional information
about attitude objects.
Individuals differing in need for
cognition (i.e., high vs. low need for
cognition) also vary in the amount of
cognitive activity (i.e., information recall,
responsiveness to peripheral cues, and

correlation of thoughts and judgments) in
which they engage (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
High need for cognition and low need for
cognition individuals also vary in their use of
stereotypes (i.e., attractiveness cues,
stereotype-consistency) when engaged in
thought (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998;
Perlini & Hansen, 2001). Individuals may use
stereotypes as a means of reducing incoming
information to a manageable size (Snyder &
Miene, 1994). This idea of information
reduction via stereotypes is similar to that of
schema use in self-generated attitude change.
It is possible, therefore, that individuals differ
in their use of schemas (i.e., stereotyping)
based on individual differences in need for
cognition. Individuals high in need for
cognition should rely on stereotypes less often
than should individuals low in need for
cognition when thinking about attitude
objects.
Hypotheses
We predict that individuals will have
greater levels of attitude polarization when
given high opportunity rather than low
opportunity for thought. We also predict that
this effect of opportunity for thought will be
affected by several other variables.
Individuals will have greater attitude
polarization if they possess well-developed
rather than less-developed schemas when
thinking about groups of people and if their
well-developed schemas are consistent rather
than inconsistent with information about those
groups. Additionally, those effects of
opportunity for thought, type of schema, and
schema consistency will be more evident in
individuals low in need for cognition rather
than individuals high in need for cognition.
Method
Participants
A total of 151 students were recruited
from undergraduate psychology courses.
Students volunteered to participate in a study
titled “Individual Differences in Perceptions
of Groups”. In exchange for participation,
students received extra credit toward a course
grade.

A total of 21 males and 130 females
participated in this study. A majority (65 %)
of the sample was Caucasian. Most
participants (57 %) were between 18 and 22
years of age.
A male experimenter randomly
assigned all participants to experimental
groups. He obtained written informed consent
from all participants. Of all participants who
volunteered for this study, only three did not
complete the experimental procedure, and
therefore their data was excluded from this
study. All participants were treated in
accordance with the Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct
(American Psychological Association, 2003).
Procedure
A male experimenter greeted each
participant in a hallway outside of a
laboratory and interviewed each participant in
an individual research room throughout this
study. He described the general purpose of his
research (i.e., studying college students’
attitudes toward groups and how individuals
thought about themselves as well as others).
After explaining his study’s general purpose,
he obtained informed consent in writing from
each participant.
He then informed participants that the
first portion of his study would involve
forming impressions of groups. He presented
an example group descriptor card that was
similar to group descriptor cards used in his
study. He had four separate attributes listed
on this example group descriptor card (e.g.,
perceptive, ordinary, visual, and overbearing). He explained to each participant
that although it would be easy for them to
view each group descriptor set as describing
an individual, it was very important for them
to keep in mind that he was describing groups
of people in these descriptor sets.
After presenting this example group
descriptor card, the experimenter informed
participants that they would respond with
their initial impressions of groups using a 15point scale. He placed this scale on a desk
directly in front of each participant. Endpoints
on this scale were labeled “very favorable

impression” (+7) and “very unfavorable
impression” (-7) and a midpoint was labeled
“neutral” (0). Intermediate points (e.g., +4, 4) were labeled as “moderately favorable”
and “moderately unfavorable” respectively.
He asked participants to provide him with
their initial impressions of the example group
descriptor card using this 15-point scale. After
participants rated their initial impression of
the example group descriptor, the
experimenter asked if they had any questions
concerning this procedure before continuing
with his experiment.
Participants were then presented with
30 separate group descriptor sets on 12.7 x
20.3 cm. cards. There were four separate
attributes (e.g., talented, independent,
unconventional, and humorous) on each
group descriptor card. The experimenter
designed 15 group descriptor cards to have
three negative attributes and one neutral
attribute (e.g., authoritative, unintelligent,
mediocre, and resentful) and 15 group
descriptor cards to have three positive
attributes and one neutral attribute (e.g.,
imaginative, loyal, inhibited, and skilled). The
experimenter chose all group attributes used
in his study from research by Norman
Anderson (1968) who developed a definitive
list of 555 personality-trait words that were
rated on likableness.
After they read each group descriptor,
participants were told to indicate their initial
feelings towards that group by saying aloud a
number on the 15-point scale that best
represented their initial feelings. The
experimenter prompted participants every 10
seconds to ensure an equal amount of time
was used in consideration of initial feelings
towards each group descriptor. He recorded
participants’ verbal responses on a separate
sheet to ensure that initial ratings remained
inaccessible to participants.
Upon receiving participants’ responses
to the last group descriptor card, the
experimenter chose two group descriptor
cards to which participants expressed
moderately favorable impressions (i.e., ratings
of +4) and two group descriptor cards to
which participants expressed moderately

unfavorable impressions (i.e., ratings of -4). If
participants provided only one or no moderate
impressions (i.e., +4 or –4), then the
experimenter chose those participants’ next
closest impression score (i.e., +3 or -3).
Prior to showing participants one of
the four group descriptor cards, the
experimenter randomly assigned some
participants to be informed either that groups
described in the following cards were
Freedom Fighters or that groups described in
the following cards were Rebel Insurgents.
After making participants aware of the
assigned groups, he asked them to provide
him with their own definitions of those groups
(i.e., Freedom Fighters or Rebel Insurgents).
He did so in order to see if participants
understood what these group labels meant.
After listening to participants’ responses, the
experimenter provided all participants with
one of two pre-determined descriptions
depending upon group assignment. For
Freedom Fighters, participants were given an
example of South American fighters
attempting to overthrow a country’s
dictatorship and establish a democracy. For
Rebel Insurgents, participants were given an
example of South American fighters
attempting to overthrow a country’s
democracy and establish a dictatorship.
Following each group description (i.e.,
Freedom Fighters or Rebel Insurgents),
participants were instructed
“…I’d like you to take some time to
think about one of these descriptions. I
want
you to concentrate all of your
thoughts on this [group] during the time
I give you. You might want to think
about how you feel about a [group] with
these characteristics. You might want to
think about [groups] you know that fit
this description. Or you might want to
think about what other qualities and
traits [groups] like this may have. Just
concentrate on this description and
continue thinking until I tell you to
stop…” (Leone, 1996, p. 385).

The experimenter then briefly displayed one
of the four pre-selected group descriptor cards
to participants and provided those participants
with an opportunity to think about the group
being described. Participants were randomly
assigned to either low (i.e., 45 sec.) or high
(i.e., 90 sec.) opportunity for thought
conditions. Opportunity for thought
conditions (45 sec. vs. 90 sec.) were taken
from prior research in which investigators
measured self-generated attitude change (see
Leone et al., 1991).
After thinking about the group
descriptor card shown, participants re-rated
their impression of that group. Specifically,
participants were instructed
“Now that you’ve had a chance to collect
your thoughts, I’d like you to once again
indicate how you feel. Sometimes
people’s feelings change even over a
short period of time as this. Of course,
you may or may not feel the same way
about the [group]. Using the scale as
before, indicate how you feel about the
[group] now.” (Leone, 1996, p. 385).
The experimenter presented a 15-point scale
to participants who then stated aloud a
number that best represented their feelings.
He recorded participants’ verbal responses on
a separate sheet to ensure that these ratings
remained inaccessible to participants. He
repeated this same procedure for the
remaining three group descriptor sets.
The experimenter measured attitude
polarization by the following means (cf.,
Tesser, 1978). If a moderately favorable (+4)
impression became more favorable (i.e., +5,
+6, or +7) or a moderately unfavorable (-4)
impression became more unfavorable (i.e., -5,
-6, or -7) following a period of thought, then
he assigned attitude change (i.e., attitude
polarization) a score of “+1”. If an initial
impression did not change following a period
of thought, then he assigned attitude change a
score of “0”. He assigned all other participant
responses (i.e., attitude attenuation) a score of
“-1”. Scores were summed across all four
descriptions with a higher total score

indicating more thought-induced attitude
polarization.
Upon completion of all thought tasks,
the experimenter presented participants with a
survey titled Individual Differences in
Cognitive Styles containing the 18-item Need
for Cognition Scale which was used to assess
individual differences in need for cognition
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Participants
used a 5-point scale with response options
labeled strongly disagree, disagree,
undecided, agree, and strongly agree to
respond to statements in the Need for
Cognition Scale. Half of the statements within
the scale were written such that agreement
indicated a high need for cognition (e.g., “I
would prefer complex to simple problems”)
and half of the statements were written such
that disagreement indicated a high need for
cognition (e.g., “I only think as hard as I have
to”).
Participant’s responses to statements
in which disagreement indicated high need for
cognition were reversed scored. Answers to
each of the 18 items on this scale were scored
such that a higher overall score was indicative
of a higher need for cognition. The
experimenter classified participants as either
high or low in need for cognition based on a
median split of overall scores. There were 76
participants categorized as high in need for
cognition and 75 participants classified as low
in need for cognition.
In terms of internal consistency,
several researchers found Cronbach’s alphas
of .85 or more for scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan,
1992; Leary, Sheppard, McNeil, Jenkins, &
Barnes, 1986). During a seven week testing
period, Sadowski and Gulgoz (1992) found a
test-retest correlation of .88 for scores on the
Need for Cognition Scale. In the current
sample, the experimenter obtained a
Cronbach’s alpha of .96 for scores on the
Need for Cognition Scale.
Researchers have conducted studies in
which they provide evidence of convergent
validity for scores on the Need for Cognition
Scale. There were positive correlations
between scores on the Need for Cognition

Scale and scores on the following measures:
attention given to tasks (e.g., Osberg, 1987),
information seeking and usage in problem
solving (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992),
and motivation for experiences that are
thought provoking (e.g., Venkatraman &
Price, 1990). Researchers have conducted
studies in which they provide evidence of
discriminant validity for scores on the Need
for Cognition Scale. There was a lack of
correlation between scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale and scores on the following
measures: dogmatism (e.g., Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982), need for closure (e.g., Petty &
Jarvis, 1996), and preference for order (e.g.,
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Researchers
have shown construct validity for scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale in studies of
information recall (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty,
1982; Lassiter, Briggs, & Bowman, 1991),
responsiveness to argument quality (e.g.,
Cacioppo, Kao, Petty, & Rodriguez, 1989;
Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), and
responsiveness to peripheral cues (e.g.,
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1981).
The experimenter included four
questions at the end of his survey in order to
assess participants’ demographic information.
Participants were first asked to indicate their
age with response options labeled 18-22, 2327, 28-32, 33-37, 38 or older. They were next
asked to indicate their sex with response
options labeled male or female. They were
asked to indicate their race with response
options labeled African-American/Black,
Caucasian/White, Hispanic, Asian, or Other.
Participants were last asked to indicate their
political affiliation with response options
labeled Democrat, Republican, or
Independent.
Upon completion of the
demographic section of his survey, the
experimenter asked each participant a series a
questions to serve as a manipulation check for
this study. He asked each participant six
questions during each post-experiment
interview. Some questions concerned detailed
portions of the study (i.e., What types of
groups did you think of? Why?), and other
questions concerned the study as a whole (i.e.,

What did you think we were looking at in this
study?). After completing the post-experiment
interview, all participants were debriefed as to
the purpose of this study.
Results
Overview of Analyses
This study was a 2 (opportunity for
thought: high vs. low) x 2 (group type:
freedom fighters vs. rebel insurgents) x 2
(need for cognition: low vs. high need) x 2
(initial attitude: positive vs. negative) factorial
design with repeated measures on the last
factor. The dependent variable in this study
was attitude polarization. All participants
scores on attitude polarization were analyzed
using a 2 (opportunity for thought) x 2 (group
type) x 2 (need for cognition) x 2 (initial
attitude) analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Main Analyses
It was hypothesized that individuals
would experience greater attitude polarization
when they were given a high opportunity for
thought rather than a low opportunity for
thought. It was also hypothesized that when
individuals thought about a group (i.e.,
freedom fighters or rebel insurgents), those
individuals would experience greater attitude
polarization if their schemas were consistent
(e.g., freedom fighters) rather than
inconsistent (e.g., rebel insurgents) with
descriptions of those groups (e.g., initially
positive attributes). Finally, it was
hypothesized that effects of opportunity for
thought, group type, and initial attitude on
attitude polarization would be more evident
for individuals low in need for cognition than
for individuals high in need for cognition.
In order for our first hypothesis to be
supported, we would expect to find a main
effect for opportunity for thought. Our second
hypothesis would be supported by a threeway interaction between opportunity for
thought, group type, and initial attitude. Our
final hypothesis would be supported by a
four-way interaction between opportunity for
thought, group type, initial attitude, and need
for cognition.

Contrary to our hypotheses, there was
no significant main effect for opportunity for
thought on attitude polarization, F(1, 143) =
2.09, p < .15. Individuals did not show
significant differences in attitude polarization
when given high opportunity for thought (M =
.28, SD = 1.46) rather than low opportunity
for thought (M = .48, SD = 1.36). There was
also no significant three-way interaction
between opportunity for thought, group type,
and initial affect, F < 1.00 (see Table 1).

During high opportunity for thought,
individuals who had schemas about a group
that were consistent with those individuals’
initial attitudes did not experience more
attitude polarization than did individuals who
had schemas about a group that were
inconsistent with initial attitudes. There was a
similar absence of attitude polarization with
individuals given low opportunity for thought
in the same schema conditions.

Table 1.Effects of Attitude Polarization in Opportunity for Thought x Group Type x Initial Attitude
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Opportunity for Thought
Low
High
M
SD
M
SD

Group Type
Freedom Fighters
Positive Attitude
Negative Attitude

92
.60

0.99
1.34

.78
.39

1.27
1.44

Rebel Insurgents
Positive Attitude
Negative Attitude

-.12
.54

1.45
1.41

-.47
.39

1.23
1.61

There was also no significant four-way
interaction between opportunity for thought,
group type, initial affect, and need for
cognition, F < 1.00 (see Table 2). During
either a low or a high opportunity for thought,
individuals low in need for cognition who had
schemas about a group that were consistent
with those individuals’ initial attitudes did not

experience more attitude polarization than did
individuals who had schemas about a group
that were inconsistent with initial attitudes.
There was a similar absence of attitude
polarization with high need for cognition
individuals in both high and low opportunity
for thought conditions.

Table 2. Effects of Attitude Polarization in Opportunity for Thought x Group Type x Initial
Attitude x Need for Cognition Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Group Type

Low Need for Cognition
Opportunity for Thought
Low
High
M
SD
M
SD

Freedom Fighters
Positive Attitude
Negative Attitude

.95
.85

.88
1.30

.47
-.05

1.46
1.63

Rebel Insurgents
Positive Attitude
Negative Attitude

0.0 1.49
.44 1.50

-.40
.35

1.27
1.53

Group Type

High Need for Cognition
Opportunity for Thought
Low
High
M
SD
M
SD

Freedom Fighters
Positive Attitude
Negative Attitude

.89
.33

1.13
1.37

1.05
0.76

1.07
1.17

Rebel Insurgents
Positive Attitude
Negative Attitude

-.23
.62

1.44
1.36

-0.56
.044

1.21
1.75

Although not predicted, there was a reliable
main effect for group type (i.e., freedom
fighters vs. rebel insurgents) on attitude
polarization. Individuals experienced greater
attitude polarization when thinking about
groups of freedom fighters (M = 1.36, SD =
1.80) than when thinking about groups of
rebel insurgents (M = 0.17, SD = 2.03),
F(1, 143) = 13.57, p < .01. This main effect
was qualified by a two-way interaction
between group type and individuals’ initial
attitudes, F(1, 143) = 12.77, p < .01.
Individuals experienced greater attitude
polarization when they had initially positive
attitudes and thought about freedom fighters
(M = 0.85, SD = 1.14) than when those
individuals had initially negative attitudes and
thought about freedom fighters (M = 0.50, SD
= 1.39). Additionally, individuals experienced
greater attitude polarization when they had
initially negative attitudes and thought about
rebel insurgents (M = 0.47, SD = 1.51) than
when those individuals had initially positive
attitudes and thought about rebel insurgents
(M = -0.29, SD = 1.35). In short, individuals
showed more attitude polarization when
schemas about a group were consistent with
initial attitudes about that group than when
schemas about a group were inconsistent with
initial attitudes.
Secondary Analyses
At the end of this experiment, the
researcher asked participants to indicate what
groups they thought about during their
opportunity for thought. Approximately 94%
of participants in this sample indicated they

were able to think about some group of
people (i.e., freedom fighters or rebel
insurgents) during assigned periods of
thought. Of all participants, 41% of
participants indicated a specific group (e.g.,
Al Qaeda), whereas 53% of participants
indicated a non-specific group (e.g.,
terrorists).
In order to examine the possibility that
group specificity (i.e., specific vs. nonspecific) might be confounded with other
factors, we evaluated our data using chisquare analyses. We conducted three chisquare analyses looking for relationships
between group specificity and the following
factors: group type, need for cognition, and
opportunity for thought. In this sample, we
found no relationship between group
specificity and group type, X2 (1, N = 142) =
1.45, p < .23, participants’ need for cognition,
X2 (1, N =142) = 1.95, p < .16, or opportunity
for thought, X2 < 1.00. In short, group
specificity was not confounded with other
factors in this experiment.
In order to explore a relationship
between group specificity and attitude
polarization, a one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was conducted. In this analysis,
group specificity was our criterion variable
and attitude polarization was our predictor
variable. There was a significant effect for
group specificity in terms of individuals’
attitude polarization, F(1, 140) = 3.83, p <
.05. Individuals who were able to imagine
specific groups of freedom fighters or rebel
insurgents tended to show more attitude
polarization (M = 1.11, SD = 1.93) than did

individuals who were able to imagine only
non-specific groups of freedom fighters or
rebel insurgents (M = 0.46, SD = 1.99) (see
Figure 1). For example, individuals who
imagined specific groups of rebel insurgents

(e.g., Al Qaeda) during thought had stronger
feelings about those groups than individuals
who imagined non-specific groups (e.g.,
terrorists).
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Figure 1. Effects of Group Type and Initial Attitude on Attitude Polarization

Having established a relationship
between group specificity and attitude
polarization, further analysis of group
specificity (i.e., specific vs. general groups)
was conducted in the form of a 2 (opportunity
for thought) x 2 (need for cognition) x 2
(group type) x 2 (initial attitude) x 2 (group
specificity) analysis of variance (ANOVA). In
this analysis, opportunity for thought, need
for cognition, initial attitude, and group
specificity were the predictor variables. The
criterion variable in this analysis was attitude
polarization. There was no significant fourway interaction between opportunity for
thought, need for cognition, group type, and
group specificity, F < 1.00. During either a
low or a high opportunity for thought,
individuals low in need for cognition who had
schemas about a group that were specific in
nature (e.g., Al Qaeda) did not experience
more attitude polarization than did individuals

who had schemas about a group that were
general in nature (e.g., terrorists). There was a
similar absence of attitude polarization with
high need for cognition individuals in both
high and low opportunity for thought
conditions.
We did, however, find a significant
two-way interaction between opportunity for
thought and group specificity, F(1, 141) =
4.38, p < .05. When individuals thought about
a specific group (e.g., Al Qaeda), they
experienced more attitude polarization when
given low opportunity for thought (M = 1.61,
SD = 1.54) rather than when given high
opportunity for thought (M = .61, SD = 2.16).
However, when individuals thought about a
general group (e.g., terrorists), they did not
experience significantly different amounts of
attitude polarization when given low
opportunity for thought (M = .46, SD = 2.13)
than when given high opportunity for thought
(M = .46, SD = 1.89) (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Effects of Opportunity for Thought and Group Specificity on Attitude Polarization

Discussion
We predicted that individuals would
have more attitude polarization when given
high opportunity rather than low opportunity
for thought. We also predicted that
individuals would have greater attitude
polarization if they possessed well-developed
rather than less-developed schemas when
thinking about groups of people and if their
well-developed schemas were consistent
rather than inconsistent with information
about those groups. Additionally,… those
effects of opportunity for thought, type of
schema, and schema consistency would be
more evident in individuals low in need for
cognition rather than individuals high in need
for cognition.
As expected, attitude polarization did
depend on type of schema individuals “tuned
in” and whether that schema was consistent or
inconsistent with those individuals’ initial
attitudes. In this study, we found increasing
amounts of attitude polarization during
thought when individuals had well-developed
schemas about a particular group than when
individuals had less-developed schemas about
a particular group. Additionally, we found

increasing amounts of attitude polarization
during thought if those individuals’ welldeveloped schemas were consistent with
group descriptions (e.g., positive initial
attitudes associated with freedom fighters)
than if those individuals’ well-developed
schemas were inconsistent with group
descriptions (e.g., negative initial attitudes
associated with freedom fighters). Therefore,
attitude polarization did depend on whether
individuals engaged in thought using welldeveloped rather than less-developed schemas
and whether those schemas were consistent or
inconsistent with those individuals’ initial
attitudes.
Attitude polarization did not vary
depending on individuals’ opportunity for
thought and differences in need for cognition.
In this study, we did not find increasing
amounts of attitude polarization with
increasing opportunity for thought.
Additionally, we did not find a higher amount
of attitude polarization in low need for
cognition individuals than in high need for
cognition individuals. Therefore, attitude
polarization did not depend on whether an
individual was given a high or low
opportunity for thought or whether an
individual was high or low in need for
cognition.

Support for attitude polarization.
We found partial support for our
hypotheses concerning schema complexity
(i.e., well-developed vs. less-developed
schemas) and schema consistency (i.e., initial
attitudes: positive vs. negative). In our study,
we asked participants to tell us which groups
of freedom fighters or rebel insurgents they
thought about during their opportunity for
thought. Our participants’ gave us answers
ranging from general group names to specific
group names for both freedom fighters (e.g.,
soldiers vs. American armed forces) and rebel
insurgents (e.g., terrorists vs. Al Qaeda). In
terms of schema complexity, we found that
amount of attitude polarization experienced
by individuals was dependent upon whether
those individuals had a well-developed (e.g.,
American armed forces) or less-developed
(e.g., soldiers) schema about groups of people
(e.g., freedom fighters). Individuals
possessing well-developed schemas about
groups showed greater attitude polarization
than did individuals possessing lessdeveloped schemas about groups. Additional
researchers have found that individuals will
experience greater attitude polarization when
they possess well-developed rather than lessdeveloped schemas (e.g., Leone & Ensley,
1985; Millar & Tesser, 1986).
In our study, if individuals “tuned in”
a schema about a specific group of freedom
fighters or rebel insurgents (e.g., American
armed forces or Al Qaeda), then they
experienced greater attitude polarization than
did those individuals that “tuned in” a schema
about a general group of freedom fighters or
rebel insurgents (e.g., soldiers or terrorists).
Other researchers have shown that individuals
varied in the amount of attitude polarization
they experienced depending on the nature of
the schema those individuals “tuned in” when
thinking about a particular attitude object
(e.g., groups of people) (Clary, Tesser,
Downing, 1978; Tesser & Danheizer, 1978).
In support of our schema consistency
(i.e., initial attitudes) hypothesis, we found
that individuals experienced more attitude
polarization when they “tuned in” schemas
that were consistent with their initial attitudes

about a group of people than when they
“tuned in” schemas that were inconsistent
with their initial attitudes about a group of
people. When individuals held initial positive
attitudes and thought about freedom fighters,
they experienced more attitude polarization
than when those individuals had initially
negative attitudes and thought about freedom
fighters. Likewise, when individuals held
initially negative attitudes and thought about
rebel insurgents, they experienced more
attitude polarization than when those
individuals had initially positive attitudes and
thought about rebel insurgents. In other
words, when individuals’ initial attitudes were
consistent with schemas they “tuned in” about
a group of people, those individuals
experienced more attitude polarization than
when their initial attitudes were inconsistent
with schemas they “tuned in” about a group
of people.
We did not find support for our
hypotheses concerning opportunity for
thought. We found that when individuals were
given a high opportunity for thought, they
tended to attenuate their attitudes rather than
polarize their attitudes. When individuals
were given a low opportunity for thought,
they tended to polarize their attitudes rather
than attenuate their attitudes. These
attenuation effects shown by individuals
given high opportunity for thought were
opposite our prediction for opportunity for
thought.
One possible explanation for a lack of
attitude polarization and a trend toward
attitude attenuation in our participants may be
an inadvertent introduction of cognitive
constraints in our study. There may have been
something in our procedure that induced
either reality constraints or process constraints
to the thought processes of our participants.
Recall that a reality constraint is the presence
of an attitude object during thought and a
process constraint is the critical examination
of beliefs during thought (Leone, Taylor, &
Adams, 1991; Leone & Aronow, 1992).
When individuals have a reality or process
constraint imposed during thought, they are
more likely to attenuate their attitudes rather

than to polarize their attitudes (Leone et al.,
1991). It is unlikely, however, that attitude
attenuation effects seen in our study were due
to cognitive constraints. Attitude attenuation
was unlikely because we did not have actual
groups present for evaluation (i.e., reality
constraint) during our study nor did we ask
our participants to critically examine their
beliefs about groups of freedom fighters or
rebel insurgents (i.e., process constraint).
Another possible explanation for lack
of support in terms of attitude polarization
and opportunity for thought may be that we
did not allow participants to view group
descriptions while participants were thinking.
It was possible then that, without group
descriptions in front of them, participants
were distracted from thinking about those
groups during their opportunity for thought.
Researchers have found that individuals
polarize their attitudes more so as a result of
thought about an attitude object (i.e., groups
of people) than when those individuals were
distracted from thought about an attitude
object (i.e., groups of people) (e.g., Leone &
Ensley, 1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). In our
study, it is unlikely that lack of attitude
polarization was due to participants’
distraction because we did not have a
distraction condition. All participants in our
study were given either 45 or 90 seconds to
think about group descriptions.
Another possible explanation for lack
of support in terms of attitude polarization
and opportunity for thought may be that we
did not provide our participants with
sufficient opportunity for thought. In our
experiment, participants received either a 45
second or 90 second opportunity for thought.
It is possible that our participants required
more than 45 or 90 seconds to think about
groups of people. However, it is not likely
that opportunity for thought was a cause for
lack of attitude polarization in our
experiment. Other researchers have used 45
versus 90 second opportunity for thought and
have replicated the self-generated attitude
change effect (e.g., Leone, 1994, 1996).
In terms of need for cognition, we
found that low need for cognition individuals

did not experience greater amounts of attitude
polarization than did high need for cognition
individuals. There was also no significant
difference in attitude attenuation based on
whether individuals were high or low in need
for cognition. There seemed to simply be no
differences in terms of attitude change based
on whether our participants were high in need
for cognition or low in need for cognition.
One plausible explanation for lack of
support in terms of moderating effect of need
for cognition on attitude polarization may
have been participants’ completion of the
Need for Cognition Scale. In this study,
participants completed the 18-item Need for
Cognition Scale to measure individual
differences in the tendency to seek out and
enjoy effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo
et al., 1984). It is possible that participants
could be primed by the Need for Cognition
Scale such that they may alter their manner of
thought. Participants may experience
“priming” when they read something or
perform a task that helps them recall a
particular attitude (Smith, 1998). When
participants do recall a particular attitude,
they may also recall other related attitudes
(e.g., Raghubir & Johar, 1997) or they may
experience spreading activation of their
attitudes (e.g., Judd, Downing, Drake, &
Krosnick, 1991). It may also be more socially
desirable for participants to view themselves
as high in need for cognition and less socially
desirable for participants to view themselves
as low in need for cognition. Therefore, if
participants took the Need for Cognition scale
prior to thought portion of an experiment,
then they may have been “primed” to think
about groups of people in a manner consistent
with expectations of high in need for
cognition individuals. However, in our study,
participants’ completion of the Need for
Cognition Scale was not likely to be related to
their attitude polarization because participants
completed the questionnaire containing the
scale after they completed all thought activity.
Additionally, other researchers assessed
people’s need for cognition along with
measuring people’s attitude polarization and
obtained the results they expected (e.g.,

Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986; but see
also Lassiter, Apple, & Slaw, 1996; Lassiter
& Apple, 1998).
Another plausible explanation for the
lack of support in terms of moderating effects
of need for cognition on attitude polarization
may be that our Need for Cognition Scale was
invalid within this study. In this study, our
scores on the Need for Cognition Scale were
unusually skewed with many more
individuals showing scores indicative of high
need for cognition. There are several factors
that may be related to this skewed set of
scores. First, there are several psychology
classes at the University of North Florida in
which the Need for Cognition Scale is
distributed and analyzed. Students are
allowed to take this scale and then analyze
their results to see if they are high or low in
need for cognition. It is possible that these
students recognized that high need for
cognition was a more socially desirable trait
and, therefore, they answered the Need for
Cognition Scale within our research in a
socially desirable manner. Although there is a
possibility of contamination of results of the
Need for Cognition Scale, it is not so
plausible that this contamination occurred in
our study. Our sample for this experiment
came from many different students from
many different psychology classes, therefore
it does not seem plausible that a majority of
our sample had been exposed to the Need for
Cognition Scale prior to this experiment.
Limitations of this Study.
One limiting factor in this study was
an issue of self-report when measuring
participants’ attitude change. We did not
actually observe changes in behavior when
measuring attitude change. In our study, we
simply asked participants to report any
changes in their feelings (i.e., attitudes). Other
researchers have indicated that perhaps selfreport measures may not be as valid in
assessing attitude change as other evaluation
methods such as direct assessment (e.g.,
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993;
McHoskey, 1995).

Another limiting factor in this study
was that there was no direct assessment of
thought processing. In other words, we were
not able to assess whether individuals were
actually engaging in thought about groups of
people during those individuals’ opportunity
for thought. Several researchers have asked
participant to write down their beliefs (i.e.,
thought listing) after an opportunity for
thought and have found attitude polarization
effects (e.g., Leone, 1989, 1994; Leone et al.,
1991). In our study, however, we did not ask
our participants to list their beliefs after their
opportunity for thought. Therefore, we were
unable to measure whether or not our
participants were actually thinking about the
groups of people we asked them to think
about.
Another limiting factor in this study
was there was no direct assessment of
individuals’ schemas about groups of freedom
fighters or rebel insurgents. In other words,
we were not able to assess whether
individuals were able to “tune in” schemas
about groups of freedom fighters or rebel
insurgents. Other researchers have asked
participants to write down their impressions
of the attitude object (i.e., person, place, or
thing) that those participants were thinking
about and were then able to assess whether
those individuals had well-developed or lessdeveloped schemas about that attitude object
(e.g., Tesser & Danheiser, 1978). In our
study, however, we did not ask our
participants to list their impressions of groups
of freedom fighters or rebel insurgents.
Therefore, we were unable to measure
whether or not our participants had welldeveloped or less-developed schemas about
groups of freedom fighters or rebel
insurgents.
Another limiting factor within this
study was a likelihood of media effects (i.e.,
news coverage of War on Terror) influencing
our participants’ thoughts. In our study, we
researched attitude change and perceptions of
groups. In particular, we researched
individuals’ attitudes toward groups of
freedom fighters and rebel insurgents. This
study took place after September 11, 2001

and during the War on Terror. Therefore, it is
quite probable that individuals’ attitudes
toward groups of freedom fighters and rebel
insurgents were influenced in part by news
media exposure. If participants were
influenced by media effects, then it is possible
that those participants would have different
attitudes about groups of freedom fighters and
rebel insurgents depending on the amount and
type of news coverage of the War on Terror
those participants had viewed. Other
researchers have found that individuals’
attitudes toward attitude objects were
influenced by exposure to media (e.g.,
Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990;
Malamuth & Check, 1981).
Future Directions.
There are many implications for future
research that have arisen as a result of our
research on attitude change and perception of
groups. In our study, we have explored only a
small portion of self-generated attitude
change as it pertained to participants’
attitudes toward groups of people.
Additionally, we researched moderating
effects of need for cognition on participants’
attitudes toward groups of people. There are,
however, some additional areas related to
self-generated attitude change that could be
explored further in later research including
comparisons of in-group bias and out-group
bias, comparisons of differences in schema
complexity between groups (e.g., freedom
fighters) and individuals (e.g., a freedom
fighter), incorporation of thought listing
procedure into methodology, and study of
different personality variables.
Our first possibility for future research
is in areas of in-group versus out-group bias
differences. In our study, we looked at
individuals’ attitudes toward groups of
freedom fighters and rebel insurgents. Most,
if not all, individuals involved in our research
would most likely not consider freedom
fighters (e.g., American soldiers) or rebel
insurgents (e.g., Al Qaeda) to be members of
their in-group. Researchers have shown that
individuals’ attitude and opinions toward
other groups of people can be influenced by

those individuals’ in-group/out-group bias
(e.g., Downing & Monaco, 1986; Lee &
Ottati, 2002). However, if we were to include
in our study evaluations of attitudes toward
groups that participants could consider as ingroups (e.g., Republicans vs. Democrats) as
well as groups that participants could consider
as out-groups (e.g., freedom fighters vs. rebel
insurgents), then perhaps we could compare
those two sets of groups to see if there is a
difference in how individuals’ form their
attitudes about those groups.
A second possibility for future
research is in areas of effects of schema
complexity on attitude change. In our study,
we had participants attempt to “tune in”
schemas about groups of freedom fighter and
rebel insurgents. Researchers have shown that
most individuals have better developed
schemas about individuals than they have
about groups of individuals (Tesser & Leone,
1977). If we were to include in our study an
evaluation of both groups of people (e.g.,
rebel insurgents) and individuals (e.g., a rebel
insurgent), then we may see that selfgenerated attitude change does depend on
whether participants think about an individual
or a group of individuals.
A third possibility for future research
involves expanding our thought portion of our
experiment in future research. In our study,
we asked participants to think about either a
group of freedom fighters or a group of rebel
insurgents for periods of 45 or 90 seconds.
However, we did not include a manipulation
check to see whether or not those individuals
were able to generate thoughts about those
groups. Several researchers have asked
participant to write down their beliefs (i.e.,
thought listing) after an opportunity for
thought and have found attitude polarization
effects (e.g., Leone, 1989, 1994; Leone et al.,
1991). If we were to include a thought listing
manipulation check in our future studies, then
we may see variations in number of beliefs
individuals’ are able to generate about
freedom fighter and rebel insurgent groups.
Using this thought listing manipulation, we
may be able to assess how individuals’
abilities to generate beliefs about a certain

group (i.e., the number of thoughts they list)
may influence their attitudes about that group.
Our final possibility for future
research involves expanding our research on
personality variables and their moderating
effects on attitude change. In our study, we
had participants complete the Need for
Cognition Scale so that we could determine
whether individual difference in need for
cognition influenced attitude change. Even
though we did not find support for the
moderating effects of need for cognition on
attitude change in this particular study, there
are many other personality variables (e.g.,
objectivism or dogmatism) that, if we
incorporate them into future studies, may
show moderating effects on attitude change.
Other researchers have found differences in
self-generated attitude change to be
moderated by individual differences in
objectivism (e.g., Leone, 1996) and
dogmatism (e.g., Leone, 1989).
Summary
Although the results of this current
study did not turn out as we had expected, it is
still important that researchers continue to
look at self-generated attitude change because
it is a concept that applies to many real world
issues. There are real world applications of
self-generated attitude change which can be
used for reduction of fears (e.g., Leone &
Aronow, 1992; Leone & Baldwin, 1983),
reduction of phobias (e.g., Leone, 1984;
Leone et al., 1983; Rothbaum, Hodges,
Kooper, Opdyke, Williford, & North, 1995),
and reduction of biased attitudes (e.g., Hall,
Varca, & Fisher, 1985; Munro & Ditto, 1997).
Self-generated attitude change applies to all
three of these areas because as individuals
think about certain objects (e.g., snakes,
heights, or terrorists), they may begin to feel
more afraid, more phobic, and more biased
then they felt originally.
For example, in the months following
September 11th, we saw continuous news
coverage of these terrorist attacks and
resulting loss of life. It would be very easy for
individuals to begin to polarize their attitude
toward terrorists because of this media

influence. According to the Council of
American-Islamic Relations and the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, anti-Arab
American sentiment rose markedly following
the attacks on September 11, 2001 (Hohman,
2002). Having extreme attitudes about
September 11th may allow individuals to act
out in a biased manner toward Middle Eastern
individuals. By understanding certain
mechanisms (e.g., self-generated attitude
change) that underlie these feelings of fear,
phobia, and bias, psychologists can develop
real world applications to assist in the
reduction of those extreme feelings.
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